The article analyses constitutional politics in the German Länder in the field of minors' rights. Since this issue seems a purely legal matter dealt with at the federal, European and international level, we should expect similar, almost identically shaped policies at the Länder level. However, the analysis brings considerable variations of constitutional activities in this field to the fore: time, frequency, and contents of respective initiatives vary significantly in the period from 1999 to 2014. These variations were due to different party strategies, diverging party platforms and majority constellations in the Länder. The analysis also shows that the public arguments brought forward in favour of constitutional amendments refer only weakly and randomly to legal provisions and processes at other levels. The political debate supporting extended children's rights rather refers to general observations, to the specific regional context, and constitutional provisions in other Länder. At least with regard to this issue, the multi-level system did not systematically impact on constitutional politics in the Länder. It rather can be understood as an opportunity structure providing parties with multiple realms in which they can pursue their goals. Thus the study shows that federal and regional party strategies are key factors in explaining policy diffusion in multilevel systems.
Introduction I
In the past decades, constitutional politics have gained increasing scholarly attention.
This research was influenced by the neo-institutionalist paradigm. According to this approach, institutions empower actors and at the same time constrain their behaviour.
Therefore, actors can be interested in changing them. In consequence, it is crucial to explore the influence of particular institutional contexts on the patterns of politics but also the reasons for changes to the constitutions (Lutz 1994; Lorenz 2005; Roberts 2008; Hayo and Voigt 2013; Robinson and Torvik 2008; Voigt 1997 Voigt , 1999 Many studies assume that the legal norms match reality on a sort of one-to-one-basis.
Accordingly, processes at a subordinate level should be shaped by rules from above, i.e. a superior level. However, empirical studies on compliance or Europeanisation often indicate that the structure of the norm addressees, their beliefs and preferences influence the effect of institutions (Börzel and Risse 2012; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Benz 2004) . In fact, we know from comparative parliamentary and policy studies that the legislative output E -4 at least one oppositional party the power to veto any attempt for constitutional change which is not in line with its preferences. Because of this moderating institutional effect, differences in the government composition of lower level parliaments would not necessarily result in diverging constitutional outputs.
As a contribution to a better understanding of the causal mechanisms in multi-level systems, the present article analyses the patterns of constitutional politics concerning minors' rights II in Germany and its Länder. These cases are 'most likely cases ' (Gerring 2007 , Eckstein 1975 , George and Bennett 2005 for a strong effect of rules at upper levels.
At least this is what many scholars of German federalism suggest. It is used to speak about Germany as a 'unitary' federalism and a 'grand coalition state' in which many policy fields at the federal and state level are regulated by the two major parties, the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, in a rather homogenous way (Abromeit 1992; Hesse 1962; Scharpf et al. 1976; Schmidt 2007: 196 ff.; Helms 2007) . This interpretation also refers to the state constitutions which are said to be overshadowed by the federal constitution (Cancik 2003; Stiens 1997; Braunschweig 1993) . Such a legal determinism of the federal and other upper levels is against the idea of sub-constitutionalism as a kind of autonomy of subordinate states within a loose two-tiered legal framework.
In fact, in a multi-level polity, not all levels of constitutionalism need to address the same issues. In Germany, the federal constitution provides a catalogue of basic rights which, of course, apply to minors, as well. In addition, the Basic Law provides that the federal level is responsible for the foreign policy and the representation of national interests in the European Union. It thus decides on legal affiliations to international or supranational organisations and international agreements that might influence minors' rights in Germany. Hence, the rules and processes at superior levels should have strong effects on the constitutional handling of minors' rights in the Länder.
However, if international legal obligations affect Länder competencies, then the Länder must consent to them before ratification. They enjoy state quality and are entitled to pass laws in their own right. They can establish similar or more protective rights concerning minors in their Land and can create own state organisational rules, e.g. in the field of Land electoral law. In this way, they can function as laboratories for inventing and testing new constitutional norms (cf. Häberle 1993; Dombert 2012: 21) . We know that Land parties' aims can differ from those of their federal party organisation (Lehmbruch 2000; superior levels (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1997; Wolf 2000; Woll and Jacquot 2010) , parties might be interested in influencing the national status quo by also playing such games at a subordinate level.
Accordingly, the German Länder are ideal cases to study the impacts of multi-level systems on subnational constitutional politics in the field of minors' rights. The study investigates which initiatives were made concerning the subject, which arguments and references were used by the political actors and how the legal framework and legal activities at the international, European, or federal level were referred to. Such an in-depth analysis makes it necessary to limit the period of investigation and the number of cases. Yet the chosen period of 15 years beginning in 1999 seems long enough to produce robust results.
The study covers four states with maximal variation concerning government composition.
Exploring two cases per group shall decrease the risk of misinterpretations. Table 1 shows that Bremen and Berlin were mostly run by SPD-led governments, while the CDU headed the governments in Saxony and Thuringia. Table 1 In most other respects, the selected Länder share the same side conditions. In all states, constitutional amendments to the Land constitution need to be adopted by a two-thirds majority in parliament. In all states, the same parties (CDU and SPD) were able to prevent a constitutional amendment. All four states get huge fiscal transfers from the federal level and other Länder as almost all federal states do. 
III

The Framework of Law and Legal Activities Concerning Minors' Rights
The German Basic Law (BL) applies to minors in the same way as to anybody else. To respect and protect human dignity and free personal development is the duty of all state authorities (Art. 1 and 2 BL). Yet, there seems to be tension between the duty the state has to fulfil and the rights of the parents because according to article 6, child care and education are the parents' natural right as well as their obligation. The state has to "watch over them in the performance of this duty" (Art. 6 par. 1 BL). In the first decades of jurisdiction, these federal provisions were interpreted in such a way that children rather were understood as objects of parental and state action, not as subjects with own, individual rights. Moreover, parents enjoyed more rights concerning their children than any other social or public institution.
The Länder can neither circumvent nor abrogate these federal legal standards but they can provide for the same or more protective rights than the Basic Law in their realm of jurisdiction. At the beginning of the investigation period, all four Land constitutions made the protection of families, child care and education the natural right of the parents. V The states' provisions were, thus, similar to that of the German Basic Law. Additionally, the Saxon and the Thuringian constitutions which were adopted in 1992 and 1993, took up some specific formulations of the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article E -7 9 of the Saxon constitution as well as Article 19 of the Thuringian constitution recognised the right of each child to a healthy mental and physical development and the special need to protect the youth against moral, mental, spiritual and physical threats. Moreover, the state has to provide preventive health care for children and young people and an infrastructure for child care. At the beginning of the investigation period, the voting age was fixed at 18 years old, although the Bremen constitution did not include this provision.
It was laid down in ordinary law.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) which had been a point of reference for the constitution-makers in Saxony and Thuringia, was signed by Germany in 1992 but with limitations.
VI The Convention covered a large array of aspects concerning children which partly affected core rules of national sovereignty or deviated from German national standards of protection. About 40 articles of the UNCRC comprised provisions concerning well-being, counter-discrimination measures, cultural rights, privacy, asylum, penal law and many other subjects. Other articles referred to the implementation of the provisions (United Nations 1990). The then incumbent federal government of CDU/CSU and FDP declared that the convention was not directly applicable within Germany and made several objections concerning custody, family and right of inheritance, judicial proceedings, the residence of foreign children in Germany, military service of children.
These objections were stated in an attachment to the ratification law. In fact, the UN Convention "does not contain a provision expressly obligating its comprehensive incorporation or requiring it to be accorded any specific type of status in national law" (Detrick 1999: 27) .
In this and the following legislative periods, the parliamentary parties of the socialist PDS, the Social Democrats and the Greens introduced separate initiatives to the federal Taking up ideas of the UN Convention, Article 24 of this charter defined particular rights of the child. According to this article, children shall have the necessary rights to sufficient protection and care. They may express their views freely which shall be taken into consideration on matters which affect them in accordance with their age and maturity and in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions.
The child's best interests must be a primary consideration. demanding that the federal government should also change the legal provisions concerning minor asylum seekers and do more for children in many aspects. In 2012, each party in opposition, i.e. the SPD, the Green and the Left Party, demanded -separately -to strengthen the role of minors as legal subjects by a constitutional amendment. In addition, the public policies were to give greater attention to the physical and mental well-being and development of children. All initiatives referred to the UN Convention. They differed with regard to the wording and the concrete policy measures. Additionally, Greens and Socialists re-introduced bills to lower the voting age.
Processes at the Länder Level
How did these legal norms and processes at upper levels affect state constitutional politics the field of minors' rights? This section starts with observing parties' legislative behaviour in Bremen and Berlin that were both governed by SPD-led governments. It then proceeds with Thuringia and Saxony, two Länder with strong Christian parties. The analysis is mostly based on printed matters and plenary minutes retrieved from the four Land parliaments. Once again, the Social Democrats sympathized with this initiative but tried to postpone a decision to avoid endangering the incumbent coalition with the CDU. The SPD argued that an enlarged and intense discourse in Bremen on this proposal was necessary.
Constitutional Politics and Minors' Rights in Länder Governed
Moreover, it found that the system of basic rights, as established in the Basic Law, could be damaged by particular state constitutional provisions concerning the rights of children. The Christian Democrats and the government stated that the Bremen constitution contained enough provisions for a legal protection of children's rights. The amendment to the constitution, as proposed by the Greens, would only replicate the recent modification of federal ordinary law concerning the rejection of violence in education at the Land level.
Here we can observe a pattern that is true for all cases. Supporters of the status quo tend to refer to the federal legislative framework and argue that it must be followed by the respective Land. In the following legislative term, the Bremen Greens re-introduced a motion to lower the voting age to 16 years old. It was based on the same arguments as in the previous initiatives concerning this issue. The discussion referred nearly exclusively to the Bremen urban context and to general arguments concerning young people's ability to make decisions. Only the Christian Democrats referred to North Rhine-Westphalia. Based on negative experiences with the election age of 16 in local elections, this Land had reincreased the voting age to 18 years old. The initiative of the Greens was rejected.
After the 2007 Bremen elections, the Social Democrats formed a coalition with the Greens. They established a parliamentary committee to draft a reform of political participation including lowering the voting age for local and possibly Land elections to 16 years old. The arguments included federal legal aspects which, however, were not predominant. They did not focus on minors' rights but more on other elements such as direct democracy. The committee considered legal changes in other German Länder as well.
Finally, the SPD pointed out that German law contains various age limits that have been changed over time. Yet CDU and FDP refused any change to the voting age. They argued that the electoral law in Bremen should mirror federal law. Hence, it should prescribe that voters must possess German nationality and have the legal age of adulthood which is fixed at 18 years old. To both parties, deviating from federal regulations by establishing a voting age of 16 years old would cause a serious inconsistency in the legal system.
The governmental majority ignored the vetoes and used the fact that the voting age was ruled outside the constitution in ordinary law which could be altered by a simple majority. E -14 13 of the Berlin constitution. This motion was probably triggered by developments at the federal level. This motion addressed several issues: each child was to be respected as an independent individual, it was to enjoy special protection by the state and the society; it should have the chance to develop individually, the right to non-violent education, to be heard on issues which affect them and the right to schooling. Young people should be guaranteed vocational training and have the right to exercise the profession. The Greens argued that Germany in general and Berlin in particular performed poorly with regard to children's protection compared to other countries and Länder. According to the Green Party, children were not sufficiently respected as independent personalities. On the contrary, children were objects of violence and not taken care of. In addition, they lacked sufficient opportunities for development and participation. The proposed constitutional amendment was to improve this performance by obliging the state and society to assist children. There was no special reference to other levels. 
E -16
of just seven years old and the eligibility to 16 years old. This can be understood as a matter of party competition among the opposition. The Pirates' arguments referred only to general ideas concerning participation and children.
The Berlin SPD parliamentary group held an inconsistent position on this issue. It found that lowering the voting age in other Länder had not succeeded because the turnout of voters of 16 and 17 years old there was below average. The SPD concluded that it would not be enough to simply grant adolescents the right to vote. Such a privilege was to be combined with responsibilities to secure reciprocity between state and citizens. However, this linkage to federal law was not explicitly mentioned. The Greens referred to the fact that the SPD of Bremen had supported the idea. The Christian Democrats wanted to have the effects of a lower voting age in local elections better evaluated. Only then would it be possible to discuss the issue, once again. In the end, the bills were voted down.
To sum up the findings: In Berlin, the parties rather considered Bremen developments than impulses from upper levels. The UN Convention was selectively referred to and did not inspire the arguments decisively. Hence, horizontal impulses impacted more on constitutional politics in Berlin than vertical ones. Unlike Bremen, the parties in Berlin did not believe that different voting ages in one federal state are a problem. The federal level was important for the argument that the voting age should be consistent with the age of criminal responsibility which is determined at the federal level and fixed at the age of 18.
However, this linkage between federal and Land law was called into question by others.
The power constellation as well as specific Berlin-related concerns dominated the process. Therefore, the constitutional output differed at the end of the investigation period from the status in Bremen.
Constitutional Politics and Minors' Rights in Länder with CDU-led Governments
In Saxony and Thuringia, the rights of children and young people were of less legislative concern for the parliamentary parties than in Bremen or Berlin. Furthermore, both Länder were latecomers in this respect. This may partly be due to the fact that both constitutions were put into effect in the early nineties and already contained certain rights of the child. Nonetheless, during the last years, the topic has gained more attention among the parties in opposition. In addition, there is some evidence about linkages between The Saxon government kept arguing that the existing constitutional provisions were sufficient for the protection of children's rights. In consequence, the ruling parties in parliament rejected the motion to lower the voting age outright. They even refused to discuss the sense of such a reduction. Instead, they argued that the Land provided sufficient opportunities for young people to participate as well as assistance.
In Thuringia, as in Saxony, constitutional amendments were only demanded by the oppositional parliamentary parties. Party introduced a similar motion in 2013 and complemented it with a bill to change the constitution to allow for a lower voting age in both local and Land elections.
The arguments in support of these proposals mirrored the former ones. They mainly referred to participation in Thuringia and to general social and value changes. Two arguments were crucial in this debate. On the one hand, it was argued that outdated electoral principles caused low political participation. On the other hand, young people were regarded as being more reasonable today and with greater insights at an earlier stage of life. Nowadays, adolescents grow up in an information and media society which creates the precondition to take over responsibility in democratic processes. The supporters, among them the Liberal Democrats, referred to developments in other Länder which had changed their laws accordingly. The Green Party referred to Austria and quoted the President of the Constitutional Court of Germany who saw a strong need to modernise electoral laws.
However, the governing party CDU rejected the initiatives referring to (federal)
Criminal Law which is based on the perception of a gradual maturation process of people.
According to this concept, people up to 21 years old are perceived to lack consciousness for the consequences of their action. Its coalition partner, the Social Democrats, joined in on this position to avoid endangering the coalition. Once again, the international and federal level was addressed selectively and with concurrent interpretations depending on the point of view to be supported in the debate.
Comparing the Cases
The comparative study of the cases shows that the parties at the subnational level referred to international, European, or federal norms concerning minors rather randomly.
What is more, these references and interpretations of the legal framework were evidently inspired by their respective party position. Based on the analysis, we see two distinct ideological profiles (table 2) that can be linked to two different theoretical understandings of constitutions: The change-oriented position, represented by parties left-of-the-centre, normally takes the initiative, strives for encompassing regulations, is inclined to change a constitution fairly frequently and ascribes it a high educative value. The status-quo-oriented position, represented by the CDU and the FDP, seeks to change a constitution as little and as rarely as possible and only at a point of time when the constitutional norms are already accepted by the broad society. These programmatic positions were predominant in the discussions. In all cases, both issues -children's rights and voting age -were discussed nearly separately from each other although both concern the rights of the same addressees and are linked to the same UN charter which aims at strengthening the well-being and participation of young people. Only two of the 20 initiatives which were covered by the sample included both (Table 3 ). This separation is also observable for the other German The parties introduced most of their initiatives separately irrespectively of partly overlapping preferences. Obviously, establishing an own profile was more important to them than cooperating.
The mentioned effect of the government's party composition materialised in a varying frequency and a varying success rate of constitutional initiatives concerning minors' rights in each group of cases. Table 2 indicates that there were far more initiatives in those Länder whose governments were led by the Social Democrats. In Bremen, we found 6 initiatives, in Berlin 7, while in Saxony there were only 4 initiatives and in Thuringia 3. The starting points of setting children's rights and the voting age on the agenda also varied with the earliest initiatives in Bremen and Berlin whereas in Saxony and Thuringia which were governed by Conservative Parties, the topic was later and more seldom on the political agenda (except one outlier initiative in 2002).
The varying starting point and frequency of constitutional activism is highly interesting since we generally find the same initiators in all four Länder. The Green Party submitted 15 of 20 bills dealing with the rights of children and young people, the Left Party (formerly PDS) eight initiatives. One initiative came from the 'Pirates'. However, it seems that the party organisations focused their energy on Länder with a higher chance of realising their aim. Pro-change oppositional parties were much more pro-active under government coalitions that included the left-centrist SPD than in other circumstances. With only one exception, joint initiatives of the Greens and the Socialists or other parties were only introduced when at least one of the initiators was part of a government coalition. These joint initiatives were results of compromises between the parties. It seems that a realistic prospect for adopting an initiative is the only reason for parties to introduce an initiative with others and not alone.
While the Socialists and the Greens were most active in initiating changes, all constitutional amendments were only successful when they got support by the Social Democrats. In the Länder with SPD-led governments, half of the initiatives were approved.
As Table 3 shows, the constitutional amendments were adopted under SPD-led governmental coalitions with the Christian Democrats (Bremen) and with the socialist PDS or its successor The Left Party (Berlin).
Interestingly, the Christian Democrats changed their position concerning explicit constitutional children's rights in both Bremen and Berlin and argued that public pressure had forced them to do so. That resulted in three constitutional amendments in Berlin (two concerning voting or referendum age, one concerning explicit Land constitutional rights of the child) and one constitutional amendment in Bremen where another, quasiconstitutional amendment was realised by an amendment of ordinary law. In the federal states which did not amend their constitutions, the Christian Democrats were the main governing party. Here, they were able to prevent longer parliamentary discussions of the topic. Accordingly, we cannot see whether they changed their view on the issue but we can suspect that due to the absence of frequent public discussions, there is no need for them to legitimise the own position and to think it through.
As a result of these mechanisms, the contents of the constitutional amendments vary, E -24 fixed how the suitability for children would be proven but at least the lower voting and referendum age was a way to provide some of the younger people with procedural rights to communicate their will to political representatives and the public administration.
Obviously, the varying constitutional treatment of minors' rights was also influenced by horizontal and vertical linkages between the party organisations. The pattern of partisan activities seems to be quite strategic. Some time after the pro-change initiatives had failed at the federal level because of the CDU's veto, similar initiatives were introduced in the more prospective Länder and after their adoption, initiators in the less prospective Länder became active and referred, inter alia, to these examples to support their proposals. In the meantime, the party factions at the federal level use Land constitutional reforms to support their own reform proposals at the federal level.
Interestingly, these linkages are rarely made transparent. When we interviewed constitutional experts of the Land parties, many of them stated that constitutional politics is mainly influenced by the particular regional settings and not a product of federal developments. Indeed, the concrete decision processes are influenced by the particular majority constellation in a Land but the diffusion of ideas and the inner-federal implications of the decisions are influenced by federal party structures. Citizens -and maybe even the negotiation partners at the Land level -are unable to understand these inner-federal constitutional dynamics when the Land party actors do not refer to activities of their sister party organisations in other Länder or at the federal level but mainly to those legislative outputs which are suitable to their aims and to regional affairs.
Even if this pattern of activity was not strategically coordinated by the federal party as a kind of multi-level game but simply arose from individual decisions based on the same political preferences of federal and Land party organisations and their embeddedness in a homogenous party discourse, it shows that the effect of institutions is strongly influenced by the preferences and strategies of exactly those parties whose action shall be bound by the rules. That makes the functioning of rules and norms ambiguous.
Conclusion
The article shows that in the field of constitutional rights of minors, the multi-level system composed by international, EU and German law is a dynamic and flexible structure with a varying impact on sub-national constitutional politics. That puts the notion of the 'unitary' German federalism in perspective. The same legal context was interpreted in different ways across Länder and party lines. Impulses to act did not come from the legal framework itself but from certain actors who found it favourable in the context of their party programme to refer to it. The party preferences also resulted in a high selectivity of constitutional issues that were put on the agenda. References to processes and rules in other Länder, at the federal or international level were used as instruments to support or reject constitutional initiatives. Insofar the multi-level system is a sort of "opportunity structure" providing the actors with multiple political realms in which they can pursue their goals. In addition, the multi-level system establishes communicative channels through which ideas and policies travel more easily.
Obviously, the federal and Land organisations of the parties stayed in contact and so the impulses and arguments passed the levels and state borders. Therefore, the constitutional issues concerning children's rights were put on the parliamentary agenda in all federal states. But the government structure influenced the level of activism and the constitutional output that differed across the Länder. The most pro-active parties were the oppositional Green and the Left Party. Their earliest and most activities took place in Länder governed by Social Democrats because the overlapping of preferences made an adoption of the initiatives more promising. While two constitutions were amended under SPD-led coalitions, no constitution was altered under a government led by the Christian Democrats.
Accordingly, the contents of the constitutions concerning minors vary in the observed German Länder. The superior levels set basic legal norms but state-level parties used their own shaping power concerning social and participatory rights. In SPD-led states, the voting age was lowered and children obtained an explicit constitutional right to develop their personalities, to be raised without violence, and to the special protection of the community against violence, neglect, and exploitation. Additionally, the state was obliged to respect, protect, and promote the rights of children. In the CDU-led states, the right to vote in elections or referendums remained limited to citizens aged 18 and above and the constitutional protection of children remained primarily a matter of the parents and state action that focused on their physical well-being. 
E -26
UNICEF emphasises today that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child "changed the way children are viewed and treated -i.e., as human beings with a distinct set of rights instead of as passive objects of care and charity" (UNICEF 2014). The article shows that it overestimates its effect. In Germany, only article 12 of the Convention received special attention. The selection was clearly influenced by the particular policy preferences of the parties. Such a selective reception is less possible for the constitutional rules in the German Basic Law which must be implemented, but some parties engaged in creating additional, more protective norms at the Land level. This variation of constitutional protection for several societal groups questions the binding effect of institutions.
In sum, those perceiving and interpreting the rules seem to be more influential in the interplay between law and politics. At least they take a selective use of rules and create legal provisions according to their preferences and power constellation. But further research is needed concerning the question as to why the level of constitutional activism by Land factions of the same parties was so much lower in cases with conservative governments although this constellation would have provided a good opportunity for the opposition to get public attention. It is also still unclear how the federal and Land parties form their constitutional preferences. Finally and more generally, it remains open as to why the actors on the one hand take legal provisions seriously as an instrument and on the other hand perceive them and comply with them so selectively.
